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The Motherhood Wage Penalty in a Mediterranean Country: 
The Case of Spain
*
 
We present evidence for the motherhood wage penalty in Spain as a representative Southern 
European Mediterranean country. We use the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP, 1994-2001) to estimate, from both pool and fixed-effects methods, a wage equation 
in terms of observed variables and other non-observed individual characteristics. The 
empirical results confirm that there is clear evidence of a wage penalty for Spanish working 
women with children. Specifically, the fact that there is a birth in the family during the current 
year means that the woman loses 9% of her wage. We also find that having one child living in 
the household means a significant loss in wages of 6%, having two children, almost 14%, 
and having three or more, more than 15%. 
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In the last two decades, a new feature has received increasing attention in the OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, the so-called 
motherhood wage penalty. That is to say, the wage gap between women with children and 
those without children. This wage penalty can be explained as part of the effects felt by the 
interruption of a woman’s employment to have children, and the resulting responsibilities she 
assumes in raising them.
1 A number of recent articles have shown the existence of this 
motherhood penalty in different countries (Korenman & Neumark, 1992, Waldfogel, 1997, 
1998a, 1998b, Lundberg & Rose, 2000, Budig & England, 2001, Anderson, Binder & Krause, 
2002, 2003, and Edwards, 2005, in the United States; Waldfogel, 1995, 1998a, Joshi, Paci & 
Waldfogel, 1999, in the United Kingdom; Phipps, Burton & Latheridge, 2001, in Canada; 
Kunze & Ejrnes, 2004, in Germany); although in other economies, basically those of Northern 
Europe, studies have not found this evidence (Albrecht, Edin, Sundstrom & Broman, 1999, in 
Sweden; Rosholm & Smith, 1996, Datta-Gupta & Smith, 2002, and Nielsen, Simonsen & 
Verner, 2004, in Denmark).  
Against this background, a series of cross-country studies, such as those by Todd 
(2001), Harkness & Waldfogel (2003), and Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel (2007a,b) present 
comparable international evidence showing a great deal of variation. Overall, it is observed 
that the United Kingdom and Australia are the countries that show the greatest losses in 
wages by mothers, with the average being more than 10% for women who have two or more 
children, followed by the US and Canada. In Germany, the penalty is around 8%, in the 
Netherlands less than 5%, whereas the wage penalty is almost imperceptible in Sweden, 
Norway and Finland.
2 These authors have related these results to the classical division of 
welfare states in industrialized countries. Thus, the liberal Anglo-American countries show 
  2the largest motherhood wage penalties, followed by the Continental conservative ones, with 
the Nordic social democratic countries exhibiting no penalty at all.  
More recently, the sociological literature has questioned the reduced typologies of 
welfare state regimes, and suggested the need to include additional possibilities. One is the 
Mediterranean (or Latin) rim, which reflects traits from both the liberal and conservative 
models, as explained below. In this context, our research uses data from Spain, which has 
rarely been considered in the literature, in order to provide evidence and explanations which 
help us to describe the motherhood wage penalty in this representative Mediterranean 
country.  
In recent years, Spain has witnessed profound changes in the social structure of the 
labour market. These include an increase in the education level of women, with a resulting 
increase in the number of women participating in the workforce and, at the same time, a 
decrease in the birth rate. Despite the lack of certainty that the traditional wage gap between 
men and women has been closing (see López, García & Hernández, 2001; de la Rica, Dolado 
& Llorens, 2005), we here present the first single-country study providing specific empirical 
evidence of the motherhood wage penalty for Spanish women. Our method takes into 
account, not only observed characteristics, but also unobserved individual heterogeneity. To 
this end, a stepwise procedure using panel data is followed in order to control for a series of 
sets of determinants of this wage penalty, and to assess the relative influence of each of these 
sets on the degree of the wage penalty.  
Specifically, while many observed characteristics, related to personal, family, human 
capital and the workplace, derived from economic rationality, are explicitly considered, the 
effects of unobserved individual heterogeneity are dealt with through the inclusion of time-
invariant individual fixed effects. In this way, and once all these factors are controlled for, the 
gap in pay finally observed between mothers and non-mothers can only be attributed to 
  3discrimination (or, for example, to time-varying unobserved characteristics, such as the 
degree of effort exerted in the workplace). A better understanding of the explanatory factors is 
needed in order to identify the relevant social policy measures that would combat potential 
discrimination against mothers. 
The estimation results show, first, that unobserved heterogeneity plays an important 
role in disentangling the lack of evidence on the motherhood wage penalty observed in the 
raw data. A double-sided interpretation can be put forward: either mothers look for jobs that 
are better paid or, women who are better paid decide to become mothers (inverse causality). 
Secondly, as expected according to the discussion presented in the next Section, the 
motherhood wage penalty in Spain is at least as large as in the conservative countries, even 
reaching the levels observed in liberal countries, in which social security is not as extensive as 
in the other types of welfare state regimes. 
The following section is dedicated to a brief background on both the characterization 
of the different welfare state regimes and the explanations for the existence of a motherhood 
wage penalty. The next section presents the database and describes some statistics of the 
sample. We then show the stochastic formulation and the empirical results. The paper ends 
with a summary of the most important conclusions.  
 
Background 
Esping-Andersen (1990) typically considers three regime models: Anglo-Saxon, 
Continental European and Nordic European. These are associated, respectively, with liberal, 
conservative and social democratic countries. As a first approximation, in the Anglo-Saxon 
model, in which a fairly high reliance on means-tested public assistance programs exists, 
individualism and the free market determine the provision of care and personal services. In 
  4contrast, the Continental countries, shaped both by the Catholic legacy and statism, and the 
Nordic countries, exhibit universal insurance programs, the latter providing for 
individualized, citizenship-based entitlements.  
Focusing on the aspects related to gender differences, the Nordic countries have 
developed strong family and equal opportunity policies, instrumented by generous maternity 
leave provisions and extensive child care. In Anglo-American countries the opposite is true, 
with poorly-developed family leave and child-care policies. The Continental countries are in 
the middle, with generous maternity leave provisions, but less extensive child-care coverage. 
These differences are reflected in the fact that, in liberal countries, such as Ireland and the 
UK, the State favours the functioning of the market, such that women are encouraged to 
participate in the labor force (particularly, in the service sector, see Arts and Gelissen, 2002), 
resulting in high levels of employment which largely take the form of part-time work (see 
Trifiletti, 1999). However, these female workers are insufficiently protected by the State, with 
this being reflected in a wide gender pay gap, and an even greater gap between mothers and 
non-mothers.
3 In the Scandinavian countries, women, irrespective of whether they are 
mothers or not, are also encouraged to participate in the labor market, especially in the public 
sector, so that few differences in employment rates between mothers and non-mothers are 
observed, and, simultaneously, the gender pay gap is the narrowest. Finally, in the 
conservative countries, labour market participation by married women is strongly 
discouraged, with a redistributive policy of allocating resources to families with children and, 
as a consequence, significant differences in employment rates exist between men and women, 
and between mothers and non-mothers, as do differences in pay between genders. 
The contributions of Todd (2001), Harkness & Waldfogel (2003), and Sigle-Rushton 
& Waldfogel (2007a,b) have been to extend the characterization of the three regime types by 
considering the motherhood wage penalty across countries. Thus, the largest penalties are 
  5observed in the liberal countries, followed by the conservative, and finally, the social 
democratic countries, in which negligible gaps are found. However, recent contributions of 
Korpi (2000), Arts and Gelissen (2002) and others, have suggested new typologies be added, 
with one being the so-called Mediterranean model.
4 The countries included in this regime 
type, such as Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain, are characterized by relatively little state 
intervention in the welfare sphere. This is reflected in the lack of an articulated social 
minimum and right to welfare, with some benefit levels being very generous (e.g., old age 
pensions), and a highly fragmented social security system, with health care institutionalized as 
a right of citizenship (Arts and Gelissen, 2002). Other important features in the 
characterization of the Mediterranean model are the gender division of paid and unpaid work, 
and the fact that social care tends to be privatized within the family.  
While these latter characteristics are not considered, by some authors, to be sufficient 
to differentiate Mediterranan countries from the Continental model, e.g. Katrugalos (1996, p. 
43) classifies them as “immature, underdeveloped species of the Continental model”, some 
others, see e.g. Trifiletti (1999), highlight two features that distinguish Mediterranean 
countries as a different regime type from the Continental. First, the subsidiary role of the 
state, which is typical of the Continental countries, is modified since, in Mediterranean 
countries, it only covers those social risks which the family cannot protect itself against. 
Second, and as stated, whereas in Continental countries most benefits devoted to the family 
are instrumented through the male breadwinner, irrespective of whether the wife works, in 
Mediterranean countries, such benefits are allocated only to families in which the wife is in 
the labor market, and thus the traditional family role of the non-working mother is not 
especially protected.  
Along these lines, Trifiletti (1999) constructs a typology of welfare states across two 
dimensions, one describing whether women are treated by the state as wives and mothers, or 
  6as workers, and a second shaping whether or not the state protects women within the labor 
market. The Mediterranean welfare state regime type is then characterized both by 
considering women fundamentally in their family role, wives and mothers, and by not 
protecting them within the labor market. Therefore, this Mediterranean type combines traits 
from both the Continental conservative and the liberal models. Specifically, in Continental 
countries, policy measures treat women as wives and mothers, whereas in liberal countries 
women are not protected within the labor market. As a counterbalance to this, in the 
Continental model, women are effectively protected in the labor market through the social 
benefits received via their husbands, whereas in liberal countries women are essentially 
considered as workers (for more on this characterization, see Trifiletti, 1999). In these 
circumstances, a reduced proportion of women work, but they work mainly full time and only 
receive benefits and access to social services through their status as workers. This is the main 
way in which they are protected within the labor market. This situation can be attributed to 
limited aid from the welfare regime, the existence of help resources from extended family 
networks, and the necessity to work within a labor market whose conditions favour men. 
Having characterized the different welfare state regime types, we now discuss the 
economic rationality for the existence of a motherhood wage penalty. The most common 
explanation for mothers earning less than non-mothers is that the loss of individual skills, as 
well as the depreciation of experience, is associated with the period spent out-of-work 
resulting from childbearing and child caring. This leads to a reduction in productivity related 
to the level of education attained by the mother (Mincer & Polachek, 1974; Ruhm 1998; 
Waldfogel, 1998a).  
The earlier applied studies on this matter emerged from the existence of wage gaps 
between married and single women (Becker, 1985). From this initial research, the first 
rigorous econometric analysis of the wage penalty comes from Korenman and Neumark 
  7(1992), who, using data from the United States, do not generally find significant effects on 
wages from having a first child, although there are effects in the case of a second child. 
Subsequently, Waldfogel (1998b), also in the United States, finds that having a first child 
does have an effect on wages, and that this increases with the arrival of the second child. She 
also finds that the existence of maternity leave, which covers the out-of-work period and 
maintains seniority/tenure, helps to reduce such a penalty. This prompts us to consider 
alternative explanations for the existence of the motherhood wage penalty. 
The first of these has to do with the fatigue experienced by a woman who cares for her 
children at home, leading to less effort being dedicated to her job activity. The greater effort 
dedicated to home activities decreases as the child grows older, and increases as a higher level 
of education is required at work (Becker, 1985). Another important factor is that women show 
a preference for jobs that allow them to combine household schedules with their work 
schedule, in exchange for a lower wage, for example, part-time employment is associated 
with a large wage penalty in the UK, Waldfogel (1995). In this sense, Budig & England 
(2001) and Anderson, Binder & Krause (2003), even when human capital-related variables 
are controlled for, confirm the existence of penalty evidence in the United States. This, they 
argue, is not due to less work effort as a consequence of maternity, but rather to the choice of 
a flexible work-schedule. 
Additional explanations are related to discrimination. On the one hand, statistical 
discrimination may explain why firms assume that all women will interrupt their working 
career at some time, although they may not subsequently have children, in such a way that 
firms tend to place them in jobs that have a lesser human capital requirement. These positions 
require less training, and consequently pay lower wages (Becker, 1991). On the other hand, 
there is a pervasive wage discrimination against women, which can be interpreted in two 
ways. The first interpretation relies on a more traditional explanation, according to which 
  8women subordinate their professional careers to those of their husbands, accepting lower paid 
jobs (Anderson, Binder & Krause, 2003). The second refers to wage discrimination against 
mothers. This source of wage differentials is difficult to measure and can only be 
approximated as the residual in wage equations (see wage decomposition procedures in 
Oaxaca & Ransom, 1994). 
Finally, in pursuing the research question of our work, that is to say, to test the 
existence of a wage penalty for Spanish working mothers, and to assess the impact of its 
determinants, we use panel data in order to estimate econometric models, such as fixed effects 
and/or instrumental variables, which allow us to control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity, thus providing more efficient and robust estimates (see, for instance, Anderson, 
Binder & Krause, 2002; Datta-Gupta & Smith, 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes & Kimmel, 2005).  
 
The Data 
The Spanish data used in this paper come from the panel formed by the eight waves of 
the ECHP (European Community Household Panel) which correspond to the years 1994 to 
2001.
5 Given our objective, women between the ages of 24 and 45 who had a paid job, either 
salaried or self-employed, were selected for the sample. Those who were in job training, or 
who worked in family businesses, were excluded. Women under 24 were ruled out, to avoid 
correlations between their education level and their hours of work, as were women older than 
45, to avoid those who had no minor children at home, but could have had them in the past. 
For each of these waves, an average of 1,400 sample observations was used, while each 
female worker was observed, on average, more than three times.  
Table 1 shows the wage gap by expressing wages and earnings of women (mothers, 
non-mothers, and all combined) as a fraction of men’s wages and earnings for the selected 
  9individuals in the most recent sample year, 2001. A first noticeable result is that women 
received 77% of the earnings of men. When we focus on hourly wages, and ignore the fact 
that women work on average fewer hours than men, the wage gap is reduced to 10%. We also 
confirm that this gender gap exists, whether or not the woman works in the private or the 
public sector, or whether or not she has a full-time or part-time contract. Only in the case of 
single women, do they receive slightly higher wages than single men.  
When looking at the differences between mothers and non-mothers in hourly wages, it 
appears initially that there is a motherhood wage advantage in the aggregate, and that in 
several kinds of work (public sector, permanent contract, salaried work) mothers make a 
larger fraction of men’s wages than do childless women. However, in several categories, such 
as among full time workers, temporary contract workers and single mothers, there is evidence 
of a motherhood wage penalty.
6  
(Table 1) 
This requires a careful treatment of all the characteristics influencing wages, in order 
to investigate the extent to which wage differences between women who are mothers and 
those who are not, can be explained by economic factors. As a consequence, controlling for 
demographic, human capital, family and job-related variables, provides a more refined 
measurement of the motherhood wage penalty. Thus, information about age, educational 
level, experience and seniority at work, size and resources of the family, and the type of 
contract, sector of activity, and firm size, is necessary to determine if differences in pay can 
be attributed or not to the characteristics studied. To the extent that panel data are available, 
time-invariant unobserved characteristics, such as motivation, desire for a professional career, 
the wish to be a mother, the interest in completion of tasks and exerting the appropriate effort, 
etc, can also be controlled for, allowing us to conclude that the family penalty finally 
  10observed can be interpreted as a proxy for discrimination against mothers, or some time-
varying unobserved characteristics. 
Therefore, the need arises for a rigorous regression analysis in order to calculate the 
effects on the wages of working mothers, controlling for both observed variables and non-
observed individual characteristics. In the next Section, we carry out a pool estimation, and 
we then take advantage of the panel structure to conduct a fixed-effects estimation. Prior to 
this, we devote some space to enumerating the variables taken into account in the analysis, 
and presenting some brief descriptive statistics in Table 2  for the last period of the sample, 
2001. 
(Table 2) 
The dependent variable on the wage equation, Wage, is expressed by the logarithm of 
real wage per hour.
7 Regarding the exogenous variables, we include the bearing of children, 
as well as several socio-demographic and other economic characteristics. In gathering the 
facts regarding having children, we consider two possible measures. The first, Birth, records 
if there has been a birth in the household during the current year. The second, Number of 
Children, is a set of qualitative variables that indicate whether the woman has no children, 
one, two, three or more. We chose these two measures since the period available only covers 
eight years and, therefore, there could have been women in the sample with children, but who 
had not had a child during the period under study. This means that the effect on wages of 
having children could have been felt some time ago, and would not be included in the 
estimates of the Birth variable.  
Additionally, we consider a broad group of explanatory variables with triple 
justification. First, to increase the reliability and strength of the estimations, by including as 
many controls as possible so that the variables Number of Children and Birth are effectively 
  11capturing the influence of motherhood. Second, to be able to provide some explanation of 
why the existence of a motherhood wage penalty in Spain is masked by the rough data 
presented in Table 1, as demonstrated below. Accordingly, including a large set of regressors 
helps us to identify which individual and job characteristics of women counteract the negative 
effect on wages of having a child. Third, to reduce the influence of any bias in the selection of 
the sample women, in terms of their participation in the labour market.
8 Specifically, with 
respect to the social-demographic variables, some are considered to be strictly individual 
(Age, Marital Status), others are related to human capital (Education, Experience, Seniority, 
Over-education), others are related to work at home (Child-care, Elder-care), and still others 
are regional or time factors (Region, Cycle). Finally, with respect to the economic variables, 
we include the resources available to the family (Wage Income, Non-wage Income, Family 
Income, Household Size), as well as others linked to the woman’s job (Part Time, Sector, 
Occupation, Activity, Company Size, Contract Type, Self-employment).  
Beginning with the dependent variable, Table 2 shows that the average wage of 
mothers is slightly higher, compared to women who have not had children. We confirm that 
5.5% of the women had a child during the current year; 26% had one child, 14% had two and 
only 2% had three or more; that is to say, almost 60% of working women sampled are 
childless. Sixty-five percent live with a partner. Regarding education level, 28% only 
completed primary school, 21% only completed secondary school and 51% completed 
university. The women in the sample have an average of 13 years of work experience and 
almost six years in their current position. Nine percent work part-time, 73% work in the 
private sector, 72% have a permanent contract and 9% are self-employed. Sixty percent of the 
female workers say their job requires less education than they actually have. The average 
number of hours devoted to child-care is 14.2 per week, while the care of other adults takes 
less than one hour a week. 
  12When comparing average values between mothers and non-mothers, the main 
differences observed in Table 2 are related to demographic and human capital variables. Thus, 
mothers are, on average, three years older than non-mothers, and most of them live with a 
partner, have almost four years more work experience and eighteen months more seniority. If 
age, experience and tenure are expected to be remunerated, then mothers should receive 
higher wages than non-mothers, which partially explains the average higher wage of the 
former. Additional factors explaining higher hourly wages for mothers are that they are more 
likely to be enrolled in the public sector, with permanent and part-time contracts (which pay 
higher hourly wages), in skilled or manual jobs, or in the service sectors. Furthermore, non-
wage income of mothers is higher than that of non-mothers (probably due to transfers from 
the government). By contrast, non-mothers have a higher level of education, since half of 
them have a university degree, and work two hours more per week than mothers. Finally, non-
mothers obtain higher family income, their household size is smaller, and they devote fewer 
hours to childcare. 
 
The Model Specification and the Empirical Results 
Empirical Specification 
Using the traditional model of human capital (Mincer, 1974), the wage equation for 
women takes the following form: 
it it i it ln µ βz α u ω =+ ++    i = 1, …, N  t = 1, …, T        (1) 
where the vector of parameters β corresponds to the set of explanatory variables zit. µ and αi 
are constant terms, with the first representing the average population, and the second, the 
individual deviation from this average. When pool estimation is carried out, αi is assumed to 
be zero, whereas in the panel estimation, αi is specific to each woman in the sample. Finally, 
  13uit represents the error terms assumed to be independent, with a null average and a constant 
variance.  
Estimation Procedure 
After an initial estimation of the regression equation (1) in pool form by Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), we use the panel structure of available information to carry out a second 
set of regressions using an estimator of fixed-effects. We choose this particular method since 
the relevant variables, whose coefficients we wish to estimate in a consistent way, correspond 
to the number of children of the working woman. The fact of having children, as well as their 
number, can be related to individual unobserved characteristics of the female worker (i.e. 
preference for a professional career, a desire to be a mother, etc.), and thus we must consider 
an estimator of fixed-effects, which gives consistent estimations, even under the hypothesis of 
correlation between individual and unobserved effects. 
In both pool and panel estimations, we propose a sequential process, progressively 
including new explanatory variables. We begin by considering, in addition to the variables 
related to having children, a series of fixed time and regional effects, as well as the Marital 
Status of the female worker. This would be only a rough measure of the wage penalty, since 
only demographic variables are included.  The results from this estimation capture the 
information coming from the raw data shown in Tables 1 and 2. In the second stage of the 
estimation, the set of variables related to human capital is added (Education, Experience, 
Seniority, Over-education and Age).
9 In this way, we take into account the possibility of 
differences in education and in experience between mothers and non-mothers. In the third 
phase, additional factors are included which give information about the job characteristics of 
the position held by the women surveyed (Occupation, Activity, Company Size, Part Time, 
Contract Type, Sector, Self-employment). Thus, the possibility of mothers choosing more 
appropriate jobs is explicitly controlled for. We add to the set of factors variables that attempt 
  14to collect characteristics related to resources, both monetary and human, in the home (Child-
care, Elder-care, Household Size, Non-wage Income, Family Income). Thus, we consider that 
households can differ between mothers and non-mothers because of their composition, and 
the resources available to them, which may indicate how decisions of women about the hours 
they work, or the wage they earn in a specific job, can be influenced by these resource-related 
variables. 
It should be noted that in the available statistical data base there is no way of knowing 
if the female worker who has given birth has taken maternity leave or not, nor do we know 
the amount of time she has taken, or whether she has extended it. Therefore, this possibility is 
not considered in our study. Nevertheless, given the existing legislation in Spain (a period of 
16 weeks absence from work compensated at a rate of 100% of her previous wage), the usual 
case is that mothers use up their maternity leave, especially if they work in the public sector, 
or have a permanent contract.
10
Empirical Results 
The results from the pool estimation related to the variables of special interest to this 
study,  Number of Children and  Birth, are shown in Table 3, while the other exogenous 
variables appear in Table A of the Appendix.
11 Significant evidence of wage penalty is only 
obtained when controls related to human capital and the workplace are included (see column 
3), quantifying the penalty as 3% for two children. When the Birth variable is used, the wage 
penalty is somewhat higher, at 6%. With respect to the other exogenous variables (see Table 
A), we confirm in this pool estimation that the fixed regional effects, as well as the Marital 
Status variable, are not significant. Wage premiums exist for higher education, broader 
experience, and greater seniority. Occupation, as well as the sector of Activity and Company 
Size, are significant variables in determining the wage per hour of the female worker. Also 
significant are the Part Time, Contract Type and Sector variables. Regarding the variables 
  15dealing with resources, only a greater Non-wage Income has a negative effect on the wage 
level, while the other variables are not significant.  
(Table 3) 
Based on these results, it seems that weak evidence for the motherhood wage penalty 
is found. Raw data displaying the wage premium for mothers have been imperceptibly 
modified by the pool estimation, which shows slightly higher wages for non-mothers, after 
controlling for human capital and job related characteristics. Compared with the international 
literature, the case of Spanish working mothers would be very close to that of the 
Scandinavian countries. However, these initial results must be treated with caution, since we 
are not including a relevant factor related to both the wages of working women, and the fact 
of having children, that is to say, the existence of unobserved characteristics. As stated earlier, 
this can be a source of an observed wage penalty and, consequently, it must be controlled for. 
In this sense, the ECHP is extremely useful since it permits us to control the influence of these 
variables.  
The results of the panel estimation of fixed-effects, presented in Table 4, show 
evidence of a motherhood wage penalty in Spain. In directly comparing Tables 3 and 4, we 
observe that the estimated coefficient of the variable of children is always more negative and 
more significant when it is estimated with panel data, with this being a first important finding 
in our study. The empirical evidence of fixed-effects, given that the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
rejects the hypothesis that all individual effects are equal and therefore a strong individual 
heterogeneity exists, indicates to us that, in fact, the wage penalty does exist in Spain for 
female workers who have children. Thus, the wage penalty suffered by working mothers is 
masked in the raw data by the existence of some characteristics of mothers, some observed 
and others not, that cause them to be perceived as receiving a higher wage than women 
without children. That is, by controlling for unobserved characteristics of women, we detect 
  16that mothers tend to earn less than non-mothers. In this sense, mothers are rewarded more for 
the unobserved characteristics (skill, desire to work, effort and concern for completion of 
tasks, etc.), which results in higher wages.
12  
(Table 4) 
As for the observed characteristics, when a comparison is now made, within Table 4, 
column by column, we observe that in the most simple specification, with none of the 
controls,  signs of the wage penalty are only found when the woman has three or more 
children, although the fact of having a birth in the family carries with it an 8% wage loss. 
From a comparison with the estimates in column 1 of Table 3 and the figures in Table 1, it 
can be deduced that mothers are rewarded more due to observed and unobserved 
characteristics. Once the latter are taken into account through time-invariant individual fixed 
effects, we can investigate the extent of the influence of the observed characteristics, which 
are entered in groups. Thus, by controlling for the variables related to human capital, the 
penalty extends to any number of children, progressively increasing from 5% with just one 
child, to more than 20% when there are three or more children. Accordingly, when there is a 
birth in the family, the woman loses 9% of her wage relative to not having a child, with this 
being interpreted as a rough average of the coefficients of Number of Children. This shows 
that, on average, mothers accumulate more human capital than non-mothers, and they are 
compensated appropriately. This becomes more evident when variables describing the job are 
included. Thus, the fact that there is a birth in the family during the current year means that 
the woman loses 9% of her wage, compared to there not having been a birth. Also, it can be 
interpreted as mothers working at firms who pay higher wages than those employing  non-
mothers. Additionally, having one child living in the household means a significant loss in 
wages of 6%, having two children, almost 14% and having three or more, more than 15%. 
  17The addition of variables describing family resources diminishes somewhat the existence of 
the motherhood wage penalty, with this being discussed below in more detail. 
One final noteworthy result is that, as we progressively include controls, the 
motherhood wage penalty becomes more apparent, showing that mothers tend to allocate 
themselves to better paid jobs or, alternatively, that women with better paid jobs are more 
likely to become mothers. This is opposite to the case of the US (see Budig & England, 2001; 
Anderson, Binder & Krause 2003), in which the motherhood wage penalty progressively 
decreases as controls are introduced in the estimation. This indicates that, in the US, the raw 
data show a clear penalty for working mothers, which decreases as additional characteristics 
are controlled for. 
 
Discussion 
Taken together, our results show that some characteristics of Spanish mothers, their 
level of accumulation of human capital, and the qualities of their job, allow them to receive 
higher wages, thus masking any wage penalty. In other words, in the case of two women with 
the same education level and job attributes, one being a mother and the other not, the first 
would receive a lower wage. Consequently, two conclusions can be immediately stated. First, 
mothers are not looking for more child-compatible jobs in exchange for lower wages. Rather, 
the opposite seems to hold. Mothers are enrolled in jobs in which they can get higher wages. 
Second, the remaining explanations for the un-revealed wage penalty in Spain rely either on 
some kind of wage discrimination, statistical or not, against mothers, or on the fact that 
mothers exert less effort at work than non-mothers. The impossibility of obtaining 
information about these two circumstances makes testing for them fruitless, and so they 
should be considered simple conjectures. In this context, if we believe that discrimination 
  18underlies the observed wage penalty, it may be interpreted as a specific feature of a probable 
Mediterranean model, as suggested by many authors, according to which, mothers’ 
employment has been traditionally discouraged, and only in very recent years has women’s 
participation begun to increase. This accords with the existence of a traditional sexual division 
of paid and unpaid work, especially care and housework, in the Mediterranean countries. Only 
in recent years has this changed, allowing for an increase in women’s participation rates that 
has, however, not ignored the fact that childcare and elder care are still primarily provided by 
women (see García, Molina & Montuenga, 2008a, 2008b). 
Nevertheless, one final possibility is that causation is acting in the opposite way. That 
is, women earning more are the ones who decide to have children. Some of the results so far 
observed support this view. First, when fixed effects are included, the wage penalty becomes 
clear. Second, we have seen that mothers enjoy greater accumulation of human capital, and 
tend to opt for jobs which allow them to obtain higher wages. Furthermore, and just as in the 
case of the pool estimation, when the variables related to the existing resources in the home 
are introduced, the wage penalty is considerably reduced (see columns 4 and 8). However, 
this cannot be interpreted as an indication of a reduction of the wage penalty. Rather, it 
indicates that the family group compensates in large measure for the lost wages resulting from 
having a child. In particular, the importance of the Non-wage Income variable leads us to 
conclude that the distribution of alternate sources of income is related to a lower wage per 
hour, which can be interpreted as that those who have more financial support out-of-work can 
afford to have a child. Again, this could be associated with a special welfare state 
characterized by the existence of maternity benefits  only for working women, and with 
reduced benefits in the case of child-care. Both are typical of the Mediterranean typology, as 
is the relevance of the family as a form of protection against labor risks. This suggests that, 
while benefits for parenthood, motherhood and childcare are not as extensive as in the 
  19conservative or social democratic countries, policies enhancing the role of the family as the 
economic center should be implemented, since the family is a significant secondary provider 
of welfare to the individual. 
In conclusion, despite our approach being limited to some extent by the fact that we 
consider only working women, and that having children is usually planned and, therefore, 
endogenous, our fixed-effects estimations effectively show the existence of the motherhood 
wage penalty in Spain, in particular, 9% if there is a birth in the family during the current 
year; 6% if having one child living in the household, almost 14% if having two, and more 
than 15% if having three or more. These figures are comparable to the Anglo-Saxon countries 
and greater than those of the Continental European countries. Thus, our analysis presents new 
empirical evidence for a Mediterranean country, illustrating some clear differences with the 
results observed in the literature for countries classified in the other well-established welfare 
state regime types. These results can be useful for future research investigating the emergence 
of a new welfare regime type, the Mediterranean or Latin rim, in which Spain can be 
interpreted as a paradigm. 
 
Notes 
1.  Other penalties derived from motherhood from a family perspective include the clear 
trade-off between work and childcare (e.g., Cohen & Bianchi, 1999; Perry-Jenkins, 
Repetti & Crouter, 2000; Abroms & Goldscheider, 2002; Craig, 2007), and limitations 
in the access to managerial and academic occupations (e.g., Polacheck, 1981; England, 
1982; Finkel & Olswang, 1996; Elliot, 2003; Edwards, 2005; Comer and Stites-Doe, 
2006), although governments and social agencies try to minimize the effects of all 
these penalties (e.g. Baum, 2003; Berger & Waldfogel, 2004; Berger, Hill & 
Waldfogel, 2005; Livermone and Powers, 2006). 
2.  Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel (2007a,b) analyse lifecycle earnings, according to which 
the largest differences in earnings are observed in countries like The Netherlands and 
  20Germany, and the smallest in Scandinavia, with the US and the United Kingdom 
situated in an intermediate position. The explanation for a different ordering in “short 
run” wages, compared to “lifetime” earnings, relies on both the longer periods out-of-
work by mothers, and on the higher protection that non-employed women receive in 
the Central European countries, compared to those living in Anglo-American 
countries.  
3.  Other international evidence on gender wage differences appears in Firestone, Harris 
& Lambert (1999), Swanberg (2005) and Urban & Olson (2005). 
4.  We thank one anonymous referee for calling our attention to this matter. 
5.  We here briefly outline Spanish social policies regarding maternity. Specifically, the 
rights recognised for maternity and child-care in Spain are fundamentally regulated by 
articles 46 and 48 of the Workers’ Statute. Maternity leave gives the right to 16 weeks 
away from work, immediately before or after the birth, paid for by the National Health 
System in the amount of 100% of the last wage. Subsequent to this leave, the mother 
is entitled to return to her job, maintaining her seniority. This leave can be shared with 
the father, although with certain restrictions: the first six weeks are exclusively for the 
mother and the rest of the time can be shared, although not simultaneously. An 
exception is made for cases of international adoption, only when the mother expressly 
gives up part of her leave. In addition, it is possible for either the mother or the father 
to take an optional leave for child-care, available from the end of the maternity leave 
to a maximum of 36 months. Although this is not paid, during this optional leave the 
same job is reserved during the first year and within the same professional group 
thereafter. There also exists a paternity leave that gives the father two additional 
weeks. The period of maternity leave in Spain is around the average for Europe, 
although the percentage of payment is among the highest. The leave for child-care in 
other European countries is often paid, although it is of much shorter duration. On the 
other hand, publicly-financed kindergartens are rare in the 0-3 year-old range, but 
quite common in the 3-5 range. Higher education, including university, is fully 
subsidized. 
6.  Similar evidence for several OECD countries is found in Harkness and Waldfogel 
(2003). 
  217.  Given the fact that the existence of children at home can affect the number of hours a 
woman works, we prefer to present the variable that collects pay data in terms of wage 
per hour rather than annual or monthly earnings. 
8.  The correction of the selection bias in a framework of panel data is currently subject to 
some debate. In spite of the existence of interesting proposals, Kyriazidou (1997) or 
Wooldridge (1995), there is no unanimity regarding the most suitable approach for its 
application (see Dustman & Rochina-Barrachina, 2007; Jensen, Rosholm & Verner, 
2002; Wooldridge, 2002). 
9.  The variables Age and Experience are introduced in squared terms to allow for the 
possibility of decreasing returns over time. 
10. This situation could be different in the case of self-employed women or those who 
work with a temporary or a fixed-term contract, but there is no available data to test 
this possibility. 
11. With respect to these variables of having children, the number of children at home 
younger than 14 was also considered, although the results are not presented given the 
fact that they do not substantially change with respect to those obtained using the two 
initial indicators. In addition, we have introduced the two original measures 
simultaneously in order to control for the influence of having children in the period 
under study. The combined effect of both measures is similar to that obtained in 
Tables 3 and 4. 
12. Alternatively, one could think in terms of inverse causality, in the sense that the 
women who earn more money are those who decide to have children. That is to say, 
there would exist a double causation between wages and having children. In this case, 
the advisable thing would be to estimate with variables instrumental for those related 
to having children. Nevertheless, this is hard to achieve given the difficulty of finding 
suitable instruments for these variables. By ignoring the possible endogeneity of the 
variable of children, the individual fixed-effects may reflect the existing correlation 
between the disturbances and the variables, thus underlining the importance of this 
inverse causal relationship. 
  22References 
Abroms, L., & Goldscheider, F. (2002). More work for mother: How spouses, cohabiting 
partners and relatives affect the hours mothers work? Journal of Family and Economic 
Issues, 23, 147-166. 
Albrecht, J.W., Edin, P-A., Sundstrom, M., & Broman, S.B. (1999). Career interruptions and 
subsequent earnings: a re-examination using Swedish data. Journal of Human Resources, 
34, 294-311. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C., & Kimmel, J. (2005). The motherhood wage gap for women in the 
United States: the importance of college and fertility delay. Review of Economics of the 
Household, 3, 17-48. 
Anderson, D.J., Binder, M., & Krause, K. (2002). The motherhood wage penalty: which 
mother pay it and why. American Economic Review, 92, 354-58. 
Anderson, D.J., Binder, M., & Krause, K. (2003). The motherhood wage penalty revisited: 
experience, heterogeneity, work effort and work-schedule flexibility. Industrial and Labour 
Relations Review, 56, 73-94. 
Arts, W., & Gelissen, J. (2002). Three worlds of welfare capitalism or more? A state-of-the-
art report. Journal of European Social Policy, 12, 137-158. 
Baum, C.L. (2003). The effects of maternity leave legislation on mothers’ labor supply after 
childbirth. Southern Economic Journal, 69, 772-799. 
Becker, G. (1985). Human capital effort, and the sexual division of labour. Journal of Labour 
Economics, 3, S33-S58. 
Becker, G. (1991). A treatise on the family. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Berger, L.M., Hill, J., & Waldfogel, J. (2005). Maternity leave, early maternal employment 
and child health and development in the US. The Economic Journal, 115, F29-F47. 
Berger, L.M., & Waldfogel, J. (2004). Maternity leave and the employment of new mothers in 
the United States. Journal of Population Economics, 17, 331-349. 
Budig, M.J., & England, P. (2001). The wage penalty for motherhood. American Sociological 
Review, 66, 204-225. 
Cohen, P., & Bianchi, S. (1999). Marriage, children and women’s employment: What do we 
know? Monthly Labor Review, 122, 22-31. 
  23Comer, D.R., & Stites-Doe, S. (2006). Antecedents and consequences of Faculty women’s 
academic-parental role balancing. Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 27, 495-512. 
Craig, L. (2007). How employed mothers in Australia find time for both market work and 
childcare. Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 28, 69-87. 
Datta-Gupta, N., & Smith, N. (2002). Children and career interruptions: the family gap in 
Denmark. Economica, 69, 609-629. 
de la Rica, S., Dolado, J.J. & Llorens, V. (2005). Ceiling and floors: gender wage gaps by 
education in Spain, IZA Discussion Papers 1483, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn 
(Germany). 
Dustmann, C., & Rochina-Barrachina, M.E. (2007). Selection correction in panel data 
models: an application to the estimation of females' wage equations. Econometrics Journal, 
10, 263-293. 
Edwards, M.E. (2005). Occupational structure and the employment of American mothers of 
young children. Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 26, 31-53. 
Elliot, M. (2003). Work and family role strain among university employees. Journal of 
Family and Economic Issues, 23, 157-181. 
England, P. (1982). The failure of human capital theory to explain occupational sex 
segregation. Journal of Human Resources, 17, 358-370. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. New York: Polity Press. 
Finkel, S.K. & Olswang, S.G. (1996). Child rearing as a career impediment to women 
assistant professors. Review of Higher Education, 17, 123-139. 
Firestone, J.M., Harris, R.J., & Lambert, L.C. (1999). Gender role ideology and the gender 
base differences in earnings. Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 20, 191-215. 
García, I, Molina, J.A., & Montuenga, V. (2008a). Intra-family distribution of paid-work 
time.  Applied Economics (forthcoming). 
García, I., Molina, J.A., & Montuenga, V. (2008b). Intra-household time allocation: gender 
differences in caring for children. Mimeo, University of Zaragoza. 
Harkness, S., & Waldfogel, J. (2003). The family gap in pay: evidence from seven 
industrialized countries. Research in Labor Economics, 22, 369-414. 
  24Jensen, P., Rosholm, M., & Verner, M. (2002). A Comparison of Different Estimators for 
Panel Data Sample Selection Models. WP 2002-01, University of Aarhus, Department of 
Economics. 
Joshi, H., Paci, P., & Waldfogel, J. (1999). The wages of motherhood: better or worse?. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23, 543-564. 
Katrougalos, G. (1996). The South European welfare model: the Greek welfare state, in 
search of an identity. Journal of the European Social Policy, 6(1), 39-60. 
Korenman, S., & Neumark, D. (1992). Marriage, motherhood, and wages. Journal of Human 
Resources, 27, 233-255. 
Korpi, W. (2000). Faces of inequality: gender, class and patterns of inequalities in different 
types of welfare state. Social Politics, 7, 127-191. 
Kunze, A., & Ejrnaes, M. (2004). Wage dips and drops around first birth. IZA Discussion 
Papers 1011, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn (Germany).. 
Kyriazidou, E. (1997). Estimation of a Panel Data Sample Selection Model. Econometrica, 
65, 1335-64. 
Livermore, M.M. & Powers, R.S. (2006). Employment of unwed mothers: the role of 
government and social support. Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 27, 479-494. 
López, A., García, J. & Hernández, P. (2001). How wide is the gap? An investigation of 
gender wage differences using quantile regression, Empirical Economics, 26, 149-167. 
Lundberg, S., & Rose, E. (2000). Parenthood and the earnings of married men and women. 
Labour Economics, 7, 689-710. 
Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, Experience and Earnings. New York: National Bureau 
Economic Research. 
Mincer, J. and Polachek, S. (1974). Family investments in human capital: earnings of women. 
Journal of Political Economy, 82, 576-608. 
Nielsen, H.S., Simonsen, M., & Verner, M. (2004). Does the gap in family-friendly policies 
drive the family gap? Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106, 721-44. 
Oaxaca, R., & Ramson, M. (1994). On discrimination and the decomposition of wage 
differentials. Journal of Econometrics, 61, 5-21. 
  25Perry-Jenkins, M., Repetti, R., & Crouter, A. (2000). Work and family in the 1990s. Journal 
of Marriage and the Family, 62, 981-998. 
Phipps, S., Burton, P., & Latheridge, L. (2001). In and out of the labour market: long-term 
income consequences of child-related interruptions to women's paid work. Canadian 
Journal of Economics 34, 411-429. 
Polacheck, S. (1981). Occupational self-selection: A human capital approach to sex 
differences in occupational structure. Review of Economics and Statistics, 63, 60-69. 
Rosholm, M., & Smith, N. (1996). The Danish gender wage gap in the 1980s: a panel data 
study. Oxford Economic Papers, 48, 254-79. 
Ruhm, C. (1998). The economic consequences of parental leave mandates: lessons from 
Europe. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 285-317. 
Sigle-Rushton, W & Waldfogel, J (2007a). The incomes of families with children: a cross-
national comparison. Journal of the European Social Policy, 17(4), 299-318. 
Sigle-Rushton, W & Waldfogel, J (2007b). Motherhood and women’s earnings in Anglo-
American, Continental European, and Nordic countries. Feminist Economics, 13(2), 55-91. 
Swanberg, J.E. (2005). Job-family role strain among low-wage workers. Journal of Family 
and Economic Issues, 26, 143-158. 
Todd, E. (2001). Educational attainment and family gaps in women’s wages: evidence from 
five industrialized countries. Luxembourg Income Study, LIS WP. N. 246, Luxembourg. 
Trifiletti, R. (1999) Southern European welfare regimes and the worsening position of 
women. Journal of European Social Policy, 9, 49-64. 
Urban, J. A. & Olson, P.N. (2005). A comprehensive employment model for low-income 
mothers. Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 26, 101-122. 
Waldfogel, J. (1995). The price of motherhood: family status and women’s pay in a young 
British cohort. Oxford Economic Papers, 47, 584-610. 
Waldfogel, J. (1997). The effects of children on women’s wages. American Sociological 
Review, 62, 209-217. 
Waldfogel, J. (1998a). The family gap for young women in the United States and Britain: can 
maternity leave make a difference? Journal of Labor Economics, 16, 505-545. 
  26Waldfogel, J. (1998b). Understanding the family gap in pay for women with children. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 12, 137-156. 
Wooldridge, J. (1995). Selection corrections for panel data models under conditional mean 
independence assumptions. Journal of Econometrics, 68, 115-132. 
Wooldridge, J. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
  27TABLE 1 
Women’s earnings and wages expressed as a percentage of men’s for different categories  
(ECHP-2001) 
 


























76.8 79.5 78.4 87.6  83.5  90.6  84.3  70.0  102.0 
























89.2 95.3 88.5 94.0  91.7  93.4  90.5  84.3  105.1 
 
Notes: 2,775 men and 1,396 women of which 959 do not have children and 437 do. 
  28TABLE 2 
Definition of variables and characteristics of sample group (ECHP-2001) 
 
Variable Definition  Women  Mothers  Non 
mothers
Wage  Log of wage per hour deflated by RPI. It is computed from Wage 








Birth  Qualitative variable indicating if there has been a birth in the household 








Expresses number of children in the household.       ___ 
  Child 0: No children. Reference category.      ___ 
































Education  Expresses the highest level of studies completed. There are three levels.         




















Experience  Calculated as difference between present age and the age at which the 







Seniority  Calculated as the number of years since the interviewee began to work 
for her present employer or business. 4 levels  of seniority are 
considered: the reference category, Seniority l, without experience; 
Seniority2, indicates less than 3 years’ experience; Seniority 3, indicates 








Over-education  A qualitative variable having the value of 1 if the worker considers that 















Elder-care  Expresses the number of hours per week that the interviewee devotes to 













Wage Income  Represents the income obtained by the worker from her work activity. 














Family Income  Represents the amount of income obtained by the worker’s family. This 
is calculated by subtracting the total worker’s income (wage and non 







Household Size  Expresses the number of adults (over 14) there are in the household not 







Part Time  Qualitative variable with a value of 1 if the worker is not full time (that  0.09  0.13  0.07 
  29is, less than 30 hours a week)   (0.29)  (0.34)  (0.25) 
Sector  Qualitative variable with a value of 1 if the woman works in the private 







Occupation  There are nine occupation categories in accordance with the National 
Occupation Classification to one digit. 
    
  Ocup1. Management in companies or in the public administration. 

























  Ocup5. Workers in the hotel and catering, personnel, security and 













  Ocup7. Craftsmen and qualified workers in the manufacturing 
industries, construction and mining, except machine and installations 
operators; qualified workers in the extraction industries, metallurgy, 
machine construction and similar; qualified workers in the graphic arts, 








  Ocup8. Machine and installations operators and fitters, mobile 







  Ocup9. non skilled workers  0.23  0.21  0.27 
Activity  There are three possibilities: agriculture, industry, services. No further 
categorisation is possible as the response classified according to the   
NACE 2 figures is blank in the Panel response files. 
    


















Company Size  Expresses the size of the establishment worked in.       
  Size0: Companies with no workers. This is the reference category       
























Contract Type  Qualitative variable with a value of 1 if the woman has a permanent 
contract. The duration of contract variable has not been included given 













Region  Fixed effects for each of the 7 regions in the NUTS 1 classification       










Note: Standard deviations in brackets  
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Pool estimation 
 



























___ ___ ___ ___ 










___ X  X  X ___ X  X   X 
Job ___  ___ X  X  ___  ___  X X 
 Resources  ___  ___  ___  X  ___  ___  ___  X 
                
N 5963  5864  4448  2294  5963  5864  4448  2294 
R
2 0.178 0.387 0.578 0.603 0.175 0.388 0.578 0.603 
 
Note: t-ratios in brackets. * significant to 5%, ** significant to 1%.  
(1)  Baseline estimation 
(2)  Human capital-related variables added 
(3)  Job-related variables added 
(4)  Resources-related variables added. 
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Fixed-effects Estimation 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 








___ ___ ___ ___ 

















___ ___ ___ ___ 










___  X X X  ___  X X    X 
Job ___  ___ X  X ___  ___ X X 
Resources  ___ ___ ___  X  ___ ___ ___  X 
          
N  1925 1907 1544  805  1925 1907 1544  805 
R


















Note: t-ratios in brackets. * significant to 5%, ** significant to 1%. Same as to Table 3. 
Note: The LM contrast, is, in fact, applied to the random effects estimation to verify whether  the variant in individual effects is 
equal to zero or not. Given that there is a high number of individual effects, this verification is much simpler to apply than a test on 
the fixed effects 
 






 Pool  Fixed-effects  Pool Fixed-effects 
Child1  -0.012 (-0.52)  -0.035 (-1.18)     
Child2  -0.034 (-1.23)  -0.111 (-2.70)     
Child3 0.001  (0.02) -0.151  (-1.90)     
Birth      -0.004 (-0.12)  -0.041 (-1.36) 
Marital Stat  0.001 (0.06)  -0.036 (-1.01)  -0.003 (-0.17)  -0.033 (-0.93) 
Educ1      
Educ2  0.070** (3.15)  0.009 (0.28)  0.069** (3.11)  0.009 (0.27) 
Educ3  0.144** (5.75)  0.048 (1.,15)  0.144** (5.74)  0.051 (1.22) 
Experience  0.014** (3.,46)  -0.000 (-0.03)  0.013** (3.41)  -0.000 (-0.01) 
Experienc2  -0.047** (-3.43)  0.007 (0.18)  -0.046** (-3.38)  0.012 (0.29) 
Senior1      
Senior2  0.191** (8.09)  0.232** (9.91)  0.191** (8.09)  0.235** (10.01) 
Senior3  0.268** (11.14)  0.176** (5.,74)  0.269** (11.14)  0.181** (5.88) 
Senior4  0.309**(10.74)  0.116** (2.,61)  0.309** (10.75)  0.116** (2.60) 
Age  -0.009(-0.48)  0.058 (1.,46)  -0.012 (-0.62)  0.041 (1.04) 
Age2  0.032 (1.12)  -0.208** (-3.73)  0.036 (1.26)  -0.18** (-3.37) 
Over-educ.  0.021 (1.38)  -0.001 (-0.08)  0.021 (1.39)  -0.000 (-0.02) 
Activity1      
Activity2  0.236** (3,69)  -0.096 (-0.96)  0.241** (3.77)  -0.098 (-0.99) 
Activity3  0.255** (4.25)  -0.042 (-0.42)  0.258** (4.30)  -0.050 (-0.49) 
Size2  -0,024 (-1,11)  -0,026 (-1,00)  -0,024 (-1,13)  -0,025 (-1,97) 
Size3  0.047* (2.01)  -0.006 (-0.24)  0.047* (2.02)  -0.009 (-0.33) 
Size4  0.074 **(3.98)  -0.045 (-1.97)  0.075** (3.98)  -0.048* (-2.08) 
Part Time  0.182** (7.98)  0.239** (8.27)  0.182** (8.01)  0.239** (8.27) 
Sector  -0.108** (-6.03)  0.021 (0.60)  -0.108** (-6.03)  0.022 (0.61) 
Permanent  0.096** (4.80)  -0.048* (-2.11)  0.096** (4.83)  -0.046* (-2.03) 
Child care  0.000 (0.59)  0.000 (0.58)  0.000 (0.05)  0.000 (0.39) 
Elderly care  0.001 (0.97)  -0.000 (-0.42)  0.001 (0.98)  -0.000 (-0.33) 
Household 
size 
-0.009 (-1.32)  -0.002 (-0.21)  -0.008 (-1.25)  0.004 (0.39) 
Non-wage 
income 
-0.198** (-4.36)  -0.279** (-6.40)  -0.195** (-4.20)  -0.269** (-5.98) 
Family 
income 
0.021** (4.48)  0.007 (0.83)  0.020** (4.48)  0.006 (0.66) 
      
Occupation yes  Yes  yes  yes 
      
RFE yes  Yes  yes  yes 
      
TFE  yes No yes no 
      
Constant  5.093** (15.37)  5.829** (8.80)  5.134** (15.61)  6.089** (9.33) 
      
N  2,294 2,294 2,294 2,294 
R
2 0.61  805 groups  0.61  805 groups 
 
Note: t-ratios in brackets. * significant to 5%, ** significant to 1%. Occupation means the 9 dummy variables. RFE means regional 
fixed effcts. TFE means time fixed effects. Yes stands for they are included in the regression. 
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